

No domain left behind:  
is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption?

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# Disclaimer

- ▶ None of the authors is in any way affiliated with Let's Encrypt
- ▶ In other words: we do not speak for them
- ▶ But if you like their work, you may consider supporting them

# The Encryption Rush

## Ed Snowden NSA's revelations



- ▶ Massive, widespread surveillance
- ▶ Worst nightmares came true

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## Ed Snowden NSA's revelations



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## Consequences:

- ▶ For many, it was a wake-up call (and panic)
- ▶ Market distrust in vendors
- ▶ Provided a great momentum for better security

## Reactions:

- ▶ IETF: RFC 7258, RFC 7624
- ▶ iOS/Android: mobile phone encryption by default
- ▶ Cloud providers enabling encryption everywhere
- ▶ ...


# More than half of web traffic is encrypted nowadays

Yet that leaves out a lot of people without HTTPS

## Firefox telemetry<sup>1</sup>



## Chrome telemetry<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> <https://telemetry.mozilla.org/>, based on *Let's Encrypt* stats page

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/https/metrics/>

# Certificates are required for encryption on the web

## Barriers to ubiquitous web encryption

- ▶ **Cost:** purchase, deployment and renewal
- ▶ **Complexity:** request, deployment (at scale)

*Let's Encrypt*<sup>3</sup> aims to make encrypted traffic ubiquitous

- ▶ Issue and re-issue costs: **\$0.00**
- ▶ Complexity mitigated by **automation**
  1. ACME protocol<sup>4</sup>
  2. and clients, e.g. Certbot<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup><https://letsencrypt.org>

<sup>4</sup>draft-ietf-acme-acme-latest → <https://ietf-wg-acme.github.io/acme/>

<sup>5</sup><https://certbot.eff.org/>

# No domain left behind

Is *Let's Encrypt* democratizing encryption?

## Research question

*“In its first year of certificate issuance, has Let's Encrypt been successful in democratizing encryption?”*

## Approach: measurements

- ▶ Analyze issuance in the first year of *Let's Encrypt*
- ▶ Show adoption trend from various perspectives
- ▶ Analyze coverage for the lower-cost end of the market

# Methodology

- ▶ Period covered: Sept. 2015-2016 (1st year)
- ▶ Results based on FQDNs reduced to 2LD/3LD form
  - ▶ a.b.c.d.com → d.com

## Datasets

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Certificates →	Certificate transparency <sup>6</sup>
Domain to IP mapping →	Farsight DNSDB <sup>7</sup>
Organization mapping →	Methodology from previous work <sup>8</sup> , using <code>whois</code> data & Maxmind GEOIP2
Registration info →	.nl registry (SIDN)

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.certificate-transparency.org/known-logs>


<sup>7</sup> <https://www.dnsdb.info/>

<sup>8</sup> S. Tajalizadehkhoob et al., “Apples, oranges and hosting providers: heterogeneity and security in the hosting market,” IEEE NOMS 2016




# Let's Encrypt Adoption Rate

► Steady growth




# Who's using *Let's Encrypt* ?

- ▶ 98% of certificates are issued outside Alexa 1M ...



# Who's using *Let's Encrypt* ?


- ▶ ...yet issuance is not restricted to lower end of the market
  - ▶ meaning: big players also use in their subdomains



# Growth is attributed to adoption by major players

3 hosting providers are responsible for 47% of the *Let's Encrypt* certified domains


November 2015




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
## September 2016




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
September 2016



**Automation works!!**

# Issuance is dominantly for web hosting


So far, no surprises



# Over 90% of domains in hosting are on shared hosting

Issuance is dominantly for the lower-cost end of the market

- ▶ Shared hosting = 10 domains/IP<sup>9</sup>
- ▶ *Let's Encrypt* reaches those with less incentive to encrypt




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
## *Let's Encrypt* certificates are valid for 90 days

The majority of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expiration



## Let's Encrypt : domain age use


- ▶ Case study .nl
- ▶ Determine the age of the domain when the cert was issued



Median, Q25, Q75 and number of monthly new certificates for .nl domains

## Let's Encrypt : deployment

- ▶ https scans + cert processing (lower bound)
- ▶ 25K randomly chosen *Let's Encrypt* FQDN



# Conclusions

## We show that

- ▶ *Let's Encrypt* has been a success
  - ▶ Reduces costs & complexity
- ▶ Democratize encryption by covering low cost end of the market (shared hosting)
  - ▶ but big players also use it
- ▶ Automation works: *Let's Encrypt's* allows for bulk issuing
  - ▶ 3 hosting providers are responsible for 47% of the *Let's Encrypt* certified domains
- ▶ The majority of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expiration (90 days)

## And find that

*Let's Encrypt* has indeed started to democratize encryption.

# Future work

## Future work

- ▶ extend measurement period
- ▶ issued versus deployed
  - ▶ active scans on shared hosting require prior knowledge of domains served (SNI)
- ▶ use by malicious actors

## Contact details

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Download our paper at:  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.03005>