

DNS Privacy - Implementation and Deployment Status

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DNS Privacy - Background

- **RFC 7558** - “Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack”
- **DPRIVE WG** (formed in 2014)

Current Charter: Stub to Recursive ONLY

- **RFC 7626**: DNS Privacy Considerations
- **RFC 7858**: Specification for DNS over TLS
- **RFC 7816**: QNAME Minimisation
 - Recursive (Rec) to Authoritative (Auth)

Port 853
Allocated

RFC 7626 - DNS Privacy Considerations


Worth a read - many
operational issues here!

- Expert coverage of risks throughout DNS ecosystem
- Rebutts “alleged public nature of DNS data”


DNS Disclosure Example

? iepg.org
? www.intercontinental.com

? iepg.org
? www.intercontinental.com



Rec



Auth

Stub Query => Rec
user src address

Client Subnet option (RFC7871)
contains source subnet
in DNS query

DNS Disclosure Example

No QNAME MIN

iepg.org

Root

iepg.org

Rec

Auth
for .org

iepg.org

DNS Disclosure Example

With QNAME MIN

org


iepg.org

Rec

Root

Auth
for .org

iepg.org



Risk Mitigation Matrix

	In-Flight		At Rest	
Risk	Stub => Rec	Rec => Auth	At Recursive	At Authoritative
Monitoring (Passive/Active)	Encryption (DNS-over-TLS)			
		QNAME Minimization		
Other Disclosure Risks e.g. Data breaches			Data Best Practices (Policies) e.g. De-identification	

Operational Challenges

Considerations for Operators

- TLS operation is a new challenge for DNS recursive operators
- Note well: historic DNS servers have **very** basic TCP capabilities
 - Newer software is adding more sophistication and modern TCP features
- In addition, TLS is evolving...

TCP/TLS Scalability

- Historic measurements used 1-shot TCP, gave results significantly worse than UDP and under reported capacity
- New DNS-over-TCP/TLS benchmarking tools are on the way (patch to dnspref).

Implementation Status

Recursive implementations

Features		Recursive resolver		
		Unbound	BIND	Knot Res
TCP/TLS Features	TCP fast open	Light Green	Grey	Dark Green
	Process pipelined queries	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green
	Provide OORR	Yellow	Dark Green	Dark Green
	EDNS0 Keepalive	Yellow	Grey	Grey
TLS Features	TLS on port 853	Dark Green	Grey	Yellow
	Provide server certificate	Dark Green	Grey	Yellow
	EDNS0 Padding	Grey	Grey	Grey
Rec => Auth	QNAME Minimisation	Dark Green	Yellow	Dark Green

- Dark Green: Latest stable release supports this
- Light Green: Patch available
- Yellow: Patch/work in progress, or requires building a patched dependency
- Grey: Not applicable or not yet planned

Stub implementations

Features		Stub			
		Idns	digit	getdns	BIND
TCP/TLS Features	TCP fast open	Light Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Grey
	Connection reuse	Light Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green
	Pipelining of queries	Grey	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green
	Process OORR	Grey	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green
	EDNS0 Keepalive	Grey	Grey	Dark Green	Grey
TLS Features	TLS on port 853	Light Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Grey
	Authentication of server	Grey	Grey	Dark Green	Grey
	EDNS0 Padding	Grey	Grey	Dark Green	Grey

- Dark Green: Latest stable release supports this
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* *getdns* uses *libunbound* in recursive mode

Deployment Status

Test Servers

- NLnet Labs have a test server today. Details:

<https://portal.sinodun.com/wiki/display/TDNS/DNS-over-TLS+test+servers>

- OARC also offering trial servers (members only at the moment).

STUB



- Modern **async DNSSEC** enabled API
 - <https://getdnsapi.net>
- Stub mode is feature rich for DNS Privacy
 - Alpha (v1.1.0a1) of a daemon mode - try it out:

<https://portal.sinodun.com/wiki/display/TDNS/DNS+Privacy+daemon>

- Challenge: Adoption in OS
 - nss_switch module?

Test Servers

- RIPE DNS WG: Presentation and discussion of offering experimental DNS Privacy Service
- RIPE are planning to co-ordinating a community effort
 - Research various solutions and issues
 - Output will be operational guidance

Summary

- Good reasons to consider DNS Privacy
- Active work on DNS Privacy standards and implementation
- Can test DNS Privacy today using getdns & current test servers
- More DNS Privacy services on the way...

Thank you!

Any Questions?

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Additional Slides

DNS-over-TLS needs TCP !

- DNS-over-TCP... historically used only as a fallback transport (TC=1 → 'one-shot' TCP, Zone transfer)
- RFC7766 (2016) - a bis of RFC5699
 - TCP a **requirement** for DNS implementations
 - Performance on par with UDP, security/robustness
- RFC7828 - edns0-tcp-keepalive
 - Timeouts for persistent TCP connections

TCP/TLS Performance


Goals:

1. Optimise TCP/TLS set up & resumption
 - TCP FastOpen, TLS resumption, [TLS 1.3]
2. Amortise cost of TCP/TLS setup
 - Keep connection open, send many messages efficiently
3. Server must handle many connections robustly
 - Learn from HTTP servers

Performance (RFC7766)

Client - pipeline requests and handle out-of-order response

Server - concurrent processing of requests sending of out of order responses



Alternative server side solutions

- dnsmdist would be great... but no support yet
- Pure TLS load balancer
 - NGINX
 - BIND article on using stunnel (add link)

Disadvantages


- server must still have full TCP capabilities
- pass through of edn0-tcp-keepalive option
- DNS specific access control is missing

TLS BCP

- UTA (Using TLS in Applications) WG produced RFC7525 this year - “BCP for TLS and DTLS”
- Key recommendations - Protocol versions:
 - **TLS v1.2** MUST be supported and preferred
- Recommended Cipher Suites (4 of ~100):
 - **AEAD mode** - Forward secrecy for key exchange
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

DNS-over-TLS
is relatively
'green-field'

Examples



Scenario 1:

Strict TLS

- Configuration:
 - **Hostname verification required**
 - Correct hostname for Unbound resolver
 - TLS as only transport
- RESULT:
 - TLS used (cert & hostname verified)

Scenario 2:

Strict TLS

- Configuration:
 - Hostname verification required (Default)
 - **No or incorrect hostname**
 - TLS as only transport
- RESULT:
 - Query fails

Scenario 3:

Opportunistic TLS

- Configuration:
 - **Hostname verification optional**
 - Valid, none or incorrect hostname
 - TLS as only transport
- RESULT:
 - TLS used (hostname verification tried but fails)

Scenario 4:

Opportunistic TLS

- Configuration:
 - Hostname verification required (default)
 - Valid, none or incorrect hostname
 - **TLS with fallback to TCP**
- RESULT:
 - TLS used (hostname verification tried but fails)